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INTRODUCTION
“It would be a grave and ironic loss if the emergence of social
media took us back to 1892 and Justice Holmes’ view that people
forfeit the First Amendment rights they enjoy in their private lives
when they go to work for the government.”1

1

Christopher Dunn, Column: Social Media, Public Employees, and First
Amendment (New York Law Journal), NYCLU (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.nyclu.org/oped/column-social-media-public-employees-and-firstamendment-new-york-law-journal.
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In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rendered his decision
in the case of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, in which he expressed his view that the free speech rights of government employees should be insignificant or nonexistent, namely that the petitioner
in that case “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but [had]
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”2 It was impossible for
him to predict that social media would revolutionize the way, manner, and audience of public employees’ speech, specifically as it relates to criticism of their employers. The First Amendment was written for the purpose of limiting the government’s ability to censor the
people’s speech and to promote democracy.3 In practice, however,
the First Amendment acts as a limit on government employees’
speech, especially if their speech is expressed through social media.
Current free speech doctrine does not sufficiently protect government employees’ First Amendment rights. In order for an employee’s speech to be protected, it must pass a three part test: 1) the
speech must not be made by a public employee “pursuant to their
official duties;”4 2) the speech must be on a matter of “public concern;”5 and 3) the employee’s interest in the speech must outbalance
the government’s interest in censoring the speech.6 There are two
major flaws in the test implemented by the Supreme Court in order
to find whether the First Amendment protects an employee. The first
part of the test, implemented by Garcetti v. Ceballos, where the government employee loses First Amendment protection if her speech
is pursuant to her official duty,7 is inadequate, overbroad, and should
be done away with completely––or at least be interpreted more narrowly. Secondly, the balancing test8 materialized in Pickering v.
Board of Education, currently gives too much weight to the government’s interests and should be interpreted to harmonize both the employee and the government’s interests.
2

McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press, LINCOLN.EDU, http://www.lincoln.edu/criminaljustice/hr/Speech.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
4
Jilka, infra note 55.
5
Bradley, infra note 64.
6
Connick, infra note 72.
7
See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
8
See generally Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High School Dist. 205, Will
Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
3
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The case Gresham v. Atlanta is a model illustration of the problematic application of current free speech doctrine as it is relevant
to social media.9 In this case, Gresham, a law enforcement officer,
complained on Facebook about the alleged unethical interference by
a department investigator in an arrest she had made.10 According to
the decision, although Gresham’s Facebook page was set to “private,” her friends could potentially view her posts and “distribute
the comment more broadly.”11 Using the Pickering analysis, the
court reasoned that the plaintiff’s speech was not one calculated to
bring an issue of public concern to the attention of either her superior
or the general population, but instead were comments made due to
personal frustration.12 Additionally, the court added that even if
there were a stronger public interest in the employee’s speech, the
balance tilted in favor of the government despite the fact that there
was no evidence of an actual disruption caused by the speech.13 As
a result, the content in the plaintiff’s posting was not protected by
the First Amendment.14
The problematic effects of current public employee speech doctrine stem directly from the improper balancing of free speech values that gave way to the drafting of the First Amendment in the first
place. First, current doctrine undermines the value of democratic
self-governance that is advanced by free speech.15 According to Alexander Meiklejohn, “[p]olitical discussion assures that the citizens
will have the necessary information to make the informed judgments
(voting) on which a self-governing society is dependent.”16 If government employees cannot criticize their employer freely, whether

9
10
11
12
13

See generally Gresham v. Atlanta, 542 Fed App’x 817 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 820.
Id.
15
Freedom of Expression, ACLU Briefing Paper Number 10, THE LECTIC
LAW LIBRARY, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/con01.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2015) [hereinafter Freedom of Expression].
16
First Amendment Theories, OKSTATE.EDU, http://media.okstate.edu/faculty/jsenat/jb3\163/theorists.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
14
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through social media or other sources, it will prevent whistleblowing, and corruption will be free-flowing.17 In addition, the citizenry
will not be able to hold government officials accountable for their
actions or gather enough information to vote and elect their government.18
Furthermore, current doctrine ignores the free speech value of
the marketplace of ideas.19 This is the “notion that, with minimal
government intervention—a laissez faire approach to the regulation
of speech and expression—ideas, theories, propositions, and movements will succeed or fail on their own merits” because individuals
have the ability to think about diverse propositions in an “open environment of deliberation and exchange” and ultimately uncover
truth.20 By silencing most public employee speech, current doctrine
hinders the progression of ideas––both wrong and right ones.21 As
Justice Kennedy emphasized in his decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, “[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government because speech
is the beginning of thought.”22 This freedom is exactly what is prevented when the marketplace of ideas is curtailed.
Lastly, by censoring public employee speech, the government is
interfering with self-expression and personal autonomy.23 The dignity and self-worth of individuals is placed at stake when they are
prevented from expressing their thoughts, desires, and aspirations.24
Freedom of expression allows individuals to fulfill their goals as human beings and should not be subordinate to any other goal––it is a
17

See J. Michael McGuinness, Whistleblowing and Free Speech: Garcetti’s
Early Progeny and Shrinking Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 24
TOURO L. REV. 529, 540 (2008), http://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1266&context=lawreview.
18
Freedom of Speech (1): Three Rationales, NAHMOD LAW (Jan. 19, 2010,
11:35 AM), http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-ofspeech/ [hereinafter Freedom of Speech].
19
See Marketplace of Ideas Theory, U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES (July 29, 2012,
3:01 PM), http://uscivilliberties.org/themes/4099-marketplace-of-ideas-theory
.html.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
23
Freedom of Speech, supra note 18.
24
Freedom of Expression, supra note 15.
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goal in itself.25 Current First Amendment doctrine does not protect
public employees from retaliation for talking about their concerns,
issues, or even gripes relating to work with their peers or others on
social media.26
So, what is to be done? Current doctrine, particularly the Garcetti test, should be done away with or at least broadened so that all
speech does not meet a form of “strict in theory, fatal, in fact” fate.27
In addition, the balancing test should be made into a true balancing
test rather than a test that gives the government the presumptive benefit of the doubt.
Part I of this comment will discuss the evolution of social media
and how it affects and promotes free speech values. Part II will discuss the current doctrine of First Amendment freedom of speech
rights as it pertains to governmental employees. Part III argues that
the Garcetti v. Ceballos test is chilling potentially important speech
by making its test vague and overbroad, and discusses getting rid of
this test altogether. Part IV focuses on the Pickering balancing test
and how it is being wrongly applied to prioritize the interests of employers and, ultimately, ignore the interests of government employees and the public. It offers a potential solution by comparing current
doctrine of public employee speech to that of private employees under the NRLA. Part V will offer some parting thoughts on the repercussions of current free speech doctrine for public employees and
how the proposed solutions will subdue these repercussions.
I. SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE PROMOTION OF FREE SPEECH VALUES
A. What is Social Media?
“Social media, while susceptible to multiple definitions, can
best be described as ‘online communications in which individuals

25

Id.
See Richard Renner, Retaliation – Public Employees and First Amendment
Rights, WORKPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, https://www.workplacefairness.org/retaliation-public-employees#1 (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
27
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
26
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shift fluidly and flexibly between the role of audience and author.’”28 Social media encompasses most facets of social networking, in which members create online profiles that they use to “become part of an online community of people with common interests.”29 Via the Internet, “citizens can publicly speak by posting
comments, tweets, and ‘likes’ to show their support for people,
causes, and interests without physically appearing in a public location like a school board meeting or a public street.”30 Through status
updates, “individuals may share and electronically document any aspect of life: relationships, emotions, social gatherings, educational
achievements, life events, and, of course, work.”31
Social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram,
have made the world a more accessible place and provided users
with a larger audience to spread their message.32 Many of these media have over 100 million active visitors per month.33 Countless individuals use these forums to “complain about work and respond to
colleagues’ complaints.”34 In essence, social media has replaced the
local bar as the new era’s “water cooler.”35 The difference is, “Facebook, Twitter and other social media are water coolers with microphones that can amplify a whisper into a shout that’s rebroadcast
28

Heather A. Morgan & Felicia A. Davis, Social Media and Employment
Law Summary of Key Cases and Legal Issues, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (Mar. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2013/04/aba_national_symposiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/10_socialmedia.authcheckdam.pdf.
29
Id.
30
Tanya M. Marcum & Sandra J. Perry, When a Public Employer Doesn’t
Like What Its Employees “Like”: Social Media and the First Amendment, 65 LAB
L.J. 1, 2 (2014).
31
Christina Jaremus, #Firedforfacebook: The Case for Greater Management
Discretion in Discipline or Discharge for Social Media Activity, 42 RUTGERS L.
REC. 1, 2 (2014-2015).
32
Gregory A. Hearing & Brian C. Ussery, The Times They Are A Changin’:
The Impact of Technology and Social Media on the Public Workplace, Part I, 86
FLA. B. J. 35, 1 (2012).
33
Ariana C. Green, Using Social Networking to Discuss Work: NLRB Protection for Derogatory Employee Speech and Concerted Activity, 27 BERKELEY
TECH L. J. 837, 838 (2012).
34
Id.
35
Social Media as the New Water Cooler, SFGATE.COM (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/Social-media-as-the-new-water-cooler-4215302.php.
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in untold directions.”36 If you are an employee who is attempting to
exercise his First Amendment rights to free speech, social media is
ideal. It offers a platform for creativity, self-expression, and allows
those who do not feel comfortable standing in front of an audience
to share their views through a medium. Most importantly, however,
social media allows the everyday citizen to share her perceptions
with a massive audience––a privilege that was previously extended
only to those with enough power to have access to traditional forms
of media.37 However, for the employer who would rather avoid criticism or negative public attention caused by employee speech, social
media can be problematic.
B. Social Media’s Effects as the New “Water Cooler”
Employee online venting and criticizing of their employer on
social media not only allows the information to be more widespread
than at the local water cooler, but also causes the speech itself to
change. First, when one speaks with the computer as an intermediary, “the activity engaged in and speech made are often much more
brazen and uninhibited than activity engaged in and speech made
face-to-face.”38 In addition, everything that is posted is saved in cyberspace.39 It is virtually impossible to erase one’s electronic footprint “once a posting has gone viral and spread rapidly via the Internet.”40 This is particularly worrisome for employers who are aware
that “an online posting can create a lingering public record online
linking a company to the actions of an individual employee,”––even
worse, it may bring on negative public attention or questions on how
they conduct their affairs.41 Finally, social media has muddled the
waters between speech made in an individual capacity and speech
made in one’s capacity as an employee.42 Because people often use

36

Id.
Social Media and Free Speech, The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly, SOCIAL
MEDIA TODAY (July 29, 2011), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/socialmedia-and-free-speech-good-bad-and-ugly.
38
Jaremus, supra note 31, at 4.
39
Id. at 5.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Hearing & Ussery, supra note 32, at 38.
37
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one account both to post about their personal life and to gripe about
their employer, it is difficult to know where the line is drawn.
C. Social Media and First Amendment Free Speech Values
As applicable to government employees, the ability to speak
about concerns and corruption inside a government entity can be key
to the democratic self-governance of citizens. Social media has facilitated communication between the government employee and
larger audiences on current issues that should concern the citizenry
at large or, at the very least, her fellow employees.43 This value represents a “commitment to republican government by allowing . . .
whistleblowing and other valuable on-the-job speech that facilitate[s] the public’s ability to hold the government politically accountable for its choices.”44 And who better to inform the public of
the internal affairs of the government than someone who witnesses
its day-to-day dealings and processes?
Social media promotes the “marketplace of ideas” theory by “articulat[ing] substantive ideas and criticisms concerning policies,
practices, and current events that may be protected [in the workplace],” and sharing them with their fellow employees, supervisors,
employers, or even the general public.45 On the other hand, information and opinions shared through social media can “be childish,
crude, immoral, disloyal or just an outlet for thought dreams to be
seen.”46 Nevertheless, “even the most unpopular idea may contain
some truth in it and may contribute to the advancement of
knowledge.”47

43

Social Media 101, UC SAN DIEGO UNIV. COMMC’NS & PUB. AFFAIRS,
http://ucpa.ucsd.edu/resources/social/social-101/ (last visited on Feb. 11, 2015).
44
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its Workers’ Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 2
(2009).
45
William A. Herbert, Can’t Escape from the Memory: Social Media and
Public Sector Labor Law, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013).
46
Id.
47
Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Why Tolerate? Reflections on the Millian Truth
Principle, 25 PHILOSOPHIA 131, 131–32 (1997), http://www.academia.edu/1115793/Why_tolerate-reflections_on_Mills_truth_principle (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
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By hindering the unraveling of these values that are promoted
by social media, free speech is chilled and censorship occurs.48 In
the context of social media speech, we might always ask ourselves:
“Is the freedom vast and dangerous?”49 The answer to this will likely
be yes.50 We might go on to ask “[m]ight we hurt ourselves, and
others?”51 Again, the answer will be yes.52 But at the end of this
inquiry, we must not forget that “we might also do some great good,
might ignite revolutions of hope among the downtrodden and oppressed,” and this value will far outweigh any of the negative consequences that the speech might implicate.53
II. CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
Free speech doctrine has had copious breakthroughs since the
first decision rendered in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford. Nevertheless, current doctrine is far from perfect. In 2006, the United
States Supreme Court rendered a decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos
that became the initial question affecting the freedom of speech of
public employees.54 In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, a District Attorney in the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office, was in charge of
supervising other lawyers.55 A defense attorney contacted Ceballos
with a concern that an affidavit used to obtain a warrant in a pending
criminal case was faulty.56 After further investigation, Ceballos determined that the affidavit had misrepresentations, and he later
spoke to a sheriff who was not able to explain the inaccuracies in
the affidavit.57 As a result, he relayed his findings to his supervisors
48

Ronald
B.
Standler,
Heckler’s
Veto,
RBS2
(1999),
http://www.rbs2.com/heckler.htm. (last visited on Feb. 11, 2015).
49
Joy Pullman, Can We Handle Social Media? Yes, If We Can Handle SelfGovernment, AEI (May 10, 2011), http://www.aei.org/publication/can-we-handle-social-media-yes-if-we-can-handle-self-government/
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
55
Michael Jilka, Garcetti v Ceballos and the Altered Landscape of the First
Amendment Free Speech Claims, 80 J. KAN. B.A. 32, 33 (2011); see also Garcetti,
547 U.S. at 410.
56
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
57
Id.
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and wrote a memorandum in which he requested that the case be
dropped.58 After a meeting with the sheriff, Ceballos’ supervisors,
Ceballos, and other employees, Ceballos’ supervisors decided to
continue the prosecution.59 He was reassigned from his calendar
deputy position and denied a promotion; he claimed that these were
retaliation for his memo.60 The Court held that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protection for his memo because he had
written the memo pursuant to his employment duties.61 In other
words, “the Court formulated a new threshold rule to govern free
speech claims: ‘we hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.’”62
Ultimately, the Garcetti rule means that a “public employer may
discipline or discharge an employee for [speech pursuant to official
duties] regardless of whether the employee’s interest in making the
speech outweighs management’s interests and regardless of whether
it was on a matter of public concern.”63 The case of Bradley v. James
is illustrative of the Garcetti effect. There, a state university police
officer alleged that his chief was intoxicated and disrupted the investigation of an incident in a student dormitory.64 The court found
that the officer’s allegations were made pursuant to his official duties and were therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection.65
Likewise, in Green v. Barrett, the Eleventh Circuit held that a prison
guard’s First Amendment rights were not protected when he reported a possible breach of prison security to an assistant superintendent as part of her official responsibilities.66 The test is absolute,
affording zero protection to those employees whose speech is “pursuant to their duties,” and giving little to no exceptions, even when
the speech could be in the public interest.
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Jilka, supra note 55, at 33; see also Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 410.
Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 410.
Jilka, supra note 55, at 33; see also Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 410.
Id.
Bradley v. James, 420 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
Id.
Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007).
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If the speech in question overcomes the Garcetti hurdle and
passes on to the second facet of the doctrine’s test, the court turns to
Pickering.67 If the employee’s speech is not pursuant to an official
duty, the next step of the inquiry is whether it is on a matter of a
public concern.68 If the speech is not on a matter of public concern,
it is not protected.69 In order to be a matter of public concern, a posting must be about a political or social subject or, at the very least,
concerning a matter that spikes the interest of the general public.70
For purposes of the Pickering test, it is irrelevant whether the post
was controversial in nature or was made in private.71 For example,
the Court held in Connick v. Meyers that matters affecting personal
concerns in a questionnaire distributed to employees throughout an
office were not protected by the First Amendment.72 In that case,
Sheila Meyers, an assistant District Attorney for Orleans Parish,
Louisiana, was transferred to a different department, which she had
resisted in private conversations with her superior and the chief district attorney.73 As a result, she distributed a questionnaire to her
fellow employees asking their opinion on her superior’s management practices.74 The Court found that most questions on the questionnaire were not on any matters of “public concern”; rather, they
were “questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers’
co-workers possess in various supervisors, the level of office morale, and the need for a grievance committee as mere extensions of
Myers’ dispute over her transfer to another section of the criminal
court.”75 As a result, her First Amendment rights were not violated

67

Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High School Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
68
Herbert, supra note 45, at 491.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 168 (1983).
73
Id. at 140.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 147 (the court did note, however, that a question in Myers’ questionnaire about whether assistant district attorneys “ever feel pressured to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates” did touch on a matter of public concern).
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and “a federal court [was] not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”76
On the other hand, in the case of Mattingly v. Milligan in the
Eastern District of Arkansas, the plaintiff, Mattingly, succeeded on
a claim that her First Amendment rights were violated when she was
terminated, and that her speech was in fact of public concern.77 Mattingly lamented via Facebook status the firing of nine of her coworkers at the County Clerk’s Office when Milligan, the newly
elected County Clerk, came into office.78 After Milligan received
numerous calls at his home complaining about the firings, he terminated Mattingly for the Facebook post.79 The Court, analyzing the
case under the Pickering layer of the doctrine, held that the plaintiff’s Facebook post was on a matter of public concern, and, as such,
was entitled First Amendment protection.80 According to the Court,
unlike in Connick, not only had the plaintiff criticized a public official in his capacity as a government employee, but the local media
had covered the election, and concerned citizens had contacted Milligan about the firings.81
Finally, even if the Court finds that the employee spoke as a citizen, not as an employee, and spoke on a matter of public concern,
she must surpass yet another barricade. The third step is to balance
the interests of allowing the employee to speak out on such issues

76

Id.
Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, *6
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).
78
Id. at *2.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.; Employee’s Facebook Posts Protected by First Amendment,
DELAWARE EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG, http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/employees-facebook-posts-protected-by-first-amendment.html
(last
visited on Feb. 11, 2015) (Curiously, the Court avoided the Garcetti question altogether: whether the speech was made pursuant to Mattingly’s duties as an employee. It is likely that if this question had been considered, Mattingly’s speech
would not have been protected by the First Amendment because “employee staffing and other, similar personnel decisions are usually considered internal, operational issues and speech about such issues are commonly found to be employee
speech”).
77
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against “the government’s interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.”82 Among the government’s interests are “avoiding disruptions in regular operations, disharmony among co-workers, erosion of close working relationships
requiring personal loyalty and confidentiality, impairment of discipline and supervisory control, and obstructions.”83 To illustrate, this
vague and subjective third step was applied in Fales v. Garst––the
Eighth Circuit held that although the education of special needs students is clearly a matter of public concern, a principal may lawfully
discharge teachers for disobeying an order to cease talking about the
subject.84 The reasoning behind stripping this teacher of her First
Amendment right to free speech was that the speech “resulted in
school factions and disharmony among their co-workers and negatively impacted [the principal’s] interest in efficiently administering
the middle school.”85
This disconcerting free speech doctrine raises the question:
What would happen if Pickering was decided under current doctrine
and in the context of social media? Particularly, what would the
Court decide in a case of a high school teacher who wrote a post on
a local newspaper’s Facebook page criticizing how the Board of Education and the District Superintendent handled past proposals to
raise new revenue for the schools? Realistically, were this issue to
reach the Supreme Court, the teacher’s speech would likely be protected––but not for the clarity of the doctrine or its impeccable fairness. Rather, because the facts are strikingly similar to Pickering,
and the Court would want to maintain their legitimacy through stare
decisis. The doctrine itself, however, when applied to any other instance but Pickering, muddles the waters of free speech and makes
it difficult to predict what is and is not protected by the First Amendment. The two particular areas of the doctrine that have shown to be
the most precarious are the Garcetti test and the Pickering balancing
test.

82
83
84
85

Herbert, supra note 43, at 493.
Id.
Fales v. Garst, 235 F.3d 1122, 1123 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id.
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III. THE GARCETTI TEST CHILLS SPEECH WHILE THE COURT
INTERPRETS IT SO BROADLY THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
OVERCOME.
A. The Scope of Garcetti
The Garcetti decision has “increasingly permit[ted] [the] government to control its employees’ expression at work, characterizing
this speech as the government’s own that it has paid with a salary.”86
As a result of Garcetti, “most lawsuits brought by public employees
contending that they were retaliated by their employers for their exercise of free speech have been won by the public employers.”87 In
fact, lower courts have been granting summary judgment “in favor
of employers at an unprecedented rate.”88 This means that if a public
employee states her thoughts and opinions while at work, and her
employer does not approve of these thoughts or opinions, she will
probably be fired despite the “public interest” requirement and the
Pickering balancing test. In most instances the Court does not even
reach the question of whether speech is on a matter of public interest; the First Amendment would most likely not protect her.
For example, in Nixon v. City of Houston, a police officer criticized his department through media outlets while on duty and in his
uniform.89 The court found that the “officer’s statements lacked a
constitutional safeguard because they were made ‘pursuant to his
official duties and during the course of performing his job.’”90 While
Nixon does seem like a case that could have been decided either way,
the scope of the ruling in Garcetti has much more far-reaching effects in its application.
In essence, the Court has decided that in spite of a public employee performing her “duties” efficiently, she is subject to being
stripped of her First Amendment protections and exposed to an adverse employment action by the government. In a Seventh Circuit
86

Norton, supra note 44, at 2.
Marcum, supra note 30, at 10.
88
Howard Kline, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Cost of Silencing Public Employees, 28 J.L. & COM. 75, 83 (2009).
89
Thomas Keenan, Circuit Court Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and
the Development of Public Employee Speech, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 854
(2011).
90
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case, guards who protested against the mistreatment of prisoners
were stripped of their First Amendment protections because their
employing prison’s General Orders required the exposure of such
misconduct, making their speech pursuant to their job duty.91 The
Tenth Circuit mimicked the previous case by holding that a transplant coordinator who complained about the hospital’s failure to
reach its level of due care was not protected by the First Amendment, because the hospital that employed her had a policy that instructed employees to report instances of unsafe conduct.92 As long
as the speech can be described as part of the speaker’s job, it will
receive no protection, regardless of its value.
Additionally, “although most public employees are not officially
assigned to engage in work-related social networking, the content of
posts by employees [on social media] might lack any First Amendment protections.”93 In fact, since Garcetti, most courts have ruled
that a post related to work duties is unprotected by the First Amendment “regardless of whether it was required by a job description or
pursuant to an employer’s directive.”94 For instance, in the case of
Graziosi v. City of Greenville, Officer Graziosi criticized the police
chief on Facebook for not sending a representative to the funeral of
a fellow officer who was killed in the line of duty.95 She made these
posts both on her own Facebook page and on the mayor’s Facebook
page and was subsequently fired by the police department.96 The
court held that “it [was] evident that her post could be construed as
an attack on [the Chief], and the other officers who were in charge
now compared to the ‘leaders’ of before.”97 In addition, although
“Graziosi’s posting was not related to any official duty she had as a
police officer, [it] was made as an employee of the GPD (Greenville
Police Department) and not a citizen of the Greenville community,”
and as a result was not protected by the First Amendment.98 It is
clear then, that if a situation arose where a public employee used her
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id.
Id.
Herbert, supra note 45, at 487.
Id. at 488.
Graziosi v. City of Greenville, 985 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811 (N.D. Miss. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812.
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personal computer, during non-working hours, to post a grievance
about a discussion between her and her supervisor where the supervisor condemned her work habits and failure to provide adequate
assistance to clients, it very well may not be protected under the First
Amendment.99 Although this similar situation was protected in Hispanics United in the private context, if applied to the public sphere,
the employee will likely be discharged without any remedy.100 More
importantly, considering the wide latitude the courts have given the
Garcetti test, it would likely be the case that even though this post
was written during non-working hours on a personal Facebook account and was generic enough that it did not disseminate information that could prove harmful to the government entity, it would
be considered “pursuant to the employees’ official duties.” The
courts, with all the deference given to the government, would likely
hold that even though this employee’s job did not require postings
of any sort as part of her official duties, since she was speaking about
the job itself, the substance of the post was “in furtherance of her
job duties.”
B. The Garcetti Test Compromises the Three Free Speech Values:
Democratic Self-Governance, Self-Autonomy, and the Marketplace
of Ideas
1. DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE
The Garcetti trend “frustrates a meaningful commitment to republican government.”101 It allows officials to “punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other valuable on-the-job speech that would
otherwise facilitate the public’s ability to hold the government politically accountable for its choices.”102 The Seventh Circuit, for example, encountered a case where “police officers were reassigned
99
Hispanics United of Buffalo, No. 3-CA-27872 (N.L.R.B. A.L.J. July 13,
2011) (NLRB found that employee’s comments about fellow employee, including
“Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don’t help our clients enough at HUB[.] I
about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u feel?” and “Tell her to come do [my]
fucking job n c if I don’t do enough, this is just dum[b]”, did not justify discharge.).
100
Jaremus, supra note 31, at 11.
101
Norton, supra note 44, at 2.
102
Id.
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after informing an assistant district attorney (“ADA”) about allegations that the police chief and deputy chief had harbored an individual wanted on felony warrants.”103 The court held that the officers’
speech was made pursuant to their official duties––specifically, the
duty to inform the district attorney of any pertinent information relating to the case and, thus, was not protected by the First Amendment.104 As the court emphasized, the officers were performing their
duties admirably.105
Nevertheless, “although their demotion for truthfully reporting
allegations of misconduct may be morally repugnant, after Garcetti
it does not offend the First Amendment.”106 Correspondingly, the
Third Circuit concluded, pursuant to Garcetti, that the First Amendment does not “protect internal reports of health and safety hazards–
–including elevated heavy metals levels––by state troopers and firearms instructors at the state’s shooting range because the reports
were made pursuant to their official duty to report operational problems and to maintain a safe worksite.”107
Garcetti creates a catch twenty-two for public employees.108 By
speaking per prescribed job duties, an employee is forgoing First
Amendment protections and may be fired for the speech, and by not
speaking per prescribed job duties, the employee may be fired for
simply not performing her job.109
For example in Garcetti v. Ceballos, Ceballos was fired for a
memorandum he wrote in support of dropping a case in which a
warrant was based on a misrepresented affidavit because his speech
was “pursuant to his job duties.”110 Nevertheless, it is possible that
if Ceballos did not report this faulty affidavit, and looked the other
way, that he could have been fired for that too. After all, part of a

103

Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 597.
105
Id. at 599.
106
Id.
107
Norton, supra note 44, at 4; see also Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231,
247 (3d Cir. 2007).
108
Christine S. Totten, Quieting Disruption: The Mistake of Curtailing Public
Employees’ Free Speech Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
233, 248 (2008).
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Herbert, supra note 45, at 487.
110
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prosecutor’s job performance requires prosecuting, but also ensuring that justice is achieved, even if that means refraining from prosecution by dismissing a meritless case.111 Nevertheless, because the
risk is less for not complaining than being a whistleblower, Garcetti
encourages public employees to look the other way from corruption
or unethical behavior, “limiting the public’s access to information
regarding the government’s affairs,” leading back to the problem of
accountability.112
The Garcetti rule is defective because, by chilling public employee speech, it prevents objections from being aired and officials
from being held accountable, which is imperative in creating exceptional leaders.113 “As the public lacks reliable information and deliberative forums, citizens are less able to . . . participate in the expressive aspects of democratic life.”114 Because the First Amendment “is understood to protect the communicative processes necessary to disseminate the information and ideas required for citizens
to vote in a fully informed and intelligent way,” when speech is suppressed––particularly in a medium as important as social media––
these democratic ideals are marred.115
2. SELF-AUTONOMY AND SELF-EXPRESSION
In addition, “pursuant official duties” that is the staple of Garcetti, is ambiguous and, thus, unpredictable to public employees
who do not know whether what they say will be protected or not.116
This is likely to chill speech, as the uncertainty about how broadly
courts will interpret “pursuant to official duties” will make employees err on the side of silence. Those who want to avoid losing their

111

Cowles v. Brownell, 73 N.Y.2d 382, 387 (N.Y.1989).
Beth Anne Roesler, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Judicially Muzzling the Voices
of Public Sector Employees, 53 S. D. L. REV. 397, 424 (2008).
113
Norton, supra note 44, at 2.
114
Mike Annany & Daniel Kreiss, A New Contract for the Press: Copyright,
Public Journalism, and Self-Governance in a Digital Age, https://danielkreiss.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/anannykreiss_contract.pdf (last visited on
Feb. 11, 2015).
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Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2355, 2367 (2000).
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jobs are not likely to get involved in any criticism of their employer,
despite its truth or importance.117
First, the Court in Garcetti failed to “articulate a ‘comprehensive
framework’ for defining in future cases what constitutes an employees’ official duties.”118 In addition, the courts relying on Garcetti
have refused to rely on the content of job descriptions because oftentimes the employee’s job description does not accurately describe
her day-to-day activities.119 Courts have been given free reign to interpret the test as broadly or narrowly as they decide.120 In AbdurRahman v. Walker, for example, the county’s sewer inspectors advised their supervisor that the county was complying with state and
federal laws.121 The inspectors were hired to formulate ordinances
about the disposal of fat, oil, and grease, and to investigate the cases
of sewer overflows.122 Nevertheless, the Court held that “all of their
speech ‘owed its existence to those [official duties],’” despite the
difference between reports that dealt specifically with sewer flows
and those that dealt with noncompliance––none of the speech was
protected by the First Amendment.123 However, the court failed to
recognize that the inspectors’ investigation was not for the purpose
of assessing compliance with state and federal law.124
Some courts have failed to recognize that “actions taken in the
course of performing job duties are distinct from activities arising
pursuant to official duties.”125 As a result, the two will be treated as
one, and all criticism or speech on one’s public employment will be
silenced.126 The Pickering test will be moot under this regime, as
those who speak truthfully on a subject converging with their “job
117
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119
Id.
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Keenan, supra note 89, at 873; see also Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567
F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009).
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First Amendment Rights, THE LEGAL SATYRICON, https://randazza.wordpress.com/2010/03/30/garcetti-v-ceballos-potentially-subsumes-public-employees-first-amendment-rights/ (last visited on Feb. 11, 2015).
126
Id.
118

2016]

IS SOCIAL MEDIA THE NEW ERA'S "WATER COOLER"?

983

duties” will never be able to reach it and have the public importance
of their speech assessed.127
3. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Garcetti’s ruling curtails public employee speech overall and interferes with the exchange of ideas between citizens and the uncovering of truth, ultimately affecting the “marketplace of ideas.”128
Public employees average more than 16 percent of the national
workforce.129 Because the doctrine does not provide them with a
space to speak as government employees nor as individuals with respect to their public employee duties, “the vitality of our public discourse will suffer.”130
The Garcetti test is particularly problematic in the arena of public employment because government employees are the individuals
who are in the best position to inform the public of the events, people, and decisions of their government, whether these are good or
bad.131 Public employees have intimate knowledge of the duties they
perform and there is “an enhanced value in allowing them to contribute to the ‘marketplace’ of ideas by speaking on matters of public
concern related to their jobs.”132 The Garcetti majority made a gross
mistake by automatically treating public employee speech made
pursuant to that worker’s official duties because they “ignored the
theoretical foundations of government speech as exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny only because of its instrumental value to the
public as listeners.”133 As Judge Souter emphasized in his dissenting
opinion in Garcetti, the fact that Ceballos was a public employee
did not make his speech less valuable––it made it invaluable.134
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C. Overcoming the Great Wall of Garcetti
The Garcetti rule should be eliminated, with the exception of
employees who are hired specifically to speak for the government
agency.135 The government should have authority over the speech of
“public employees that it has retained to deliver a particular viewpoint that is transparently governmental in origin, and, thus open to
the public’s meaningful credibility and accountability.”136
For example, the employee in Korb v. Raytheon was not protected by the First Amendment––and rightfully not so.137 In this
case, the plaintiff, Korb, joined the executive board of the Committee for National Security (“CNS”) as a spokesperson.138 The CNS is
a “nonprofit organization dedicated to informing the public about
issues of national security and the prevention of nuclear war.”139 At
a press conference, Korb was critical of increased defense spending
and urged a scaling back of the 600-ship, 15-carrier group Navy supported by the Secretary of the Navy.140 The court ruled that:
. . . the public perception after the press conference
was that a Raytheon lobbyist advocated a reduction
in defense spending. Raytheon had a financial stake
in not advocating that position. Therefore, it determined that Korb had lost his effectiveness as its
spokesperson. There is no public policy prohibiting
an employer from discharging an ineffective at-will
employee. The fact that Korb’s job duties included
public speaking does not alter this rule.141
As a result, the government should be able to fire or discipline
employees if they are hired “to deliver such a transparently governmental message who carries out her communicative duties in a way

135
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138
Ronald B. Standler, Freedom of Speech in the USA For Employees of Private Companies, RBS2, http//www.rbs2.com/freespch.htm (last visited on Feb.
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that garbles, distorts, contradicts, or otherwise undermines that message.”142
Unlike in Korb, where the plaintiff was hired to spread the message that CNS was intending to send to the public,143 other public
officials should not be assumed to be spokespeople by virtue of their
position for their speech criticizing their employer. For example, a
fire chief or police chief should not be terminated for speech uncovering corruption in their agency or department simply because it
may be inferred that they speak on behalf of that department.144 Although police and firefighter chiefs do, in fact, speak on behalf of
their departments for purposes of their positions, the scope of their
role is narrow and intended to communicate the basic information
necessary to inform the public on events and happenings to ensure
their safety. Unlike the plaintiff in Korb, a public official’s spokesperson duties should not go as far as transmitting someone else’s
message to the public.
IV. THE PICKERING BALANCING TEST IS BEING WRONGLY APPLIED
AND TILTS THE FAVOR TOWARDS EMPLOYERS’ INTERESTS.
A. When “Balance” Becomes Disproportion: Pickering
The ideal goal upon which the Pickering balancing test was
molded was to achieve “a balance between the [public employee],
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.”145 Nevertheless, this balance is not being achieved. In fact, when analyzing
cases under this prong of the free speech doctrine, courts rarely give
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any deference to the interests of the employee and the public’s interest in hearing that employee speak, relying solely on the interests
of the government to make their determination.146
Although Graziosi v. City of Greenville was decided on the Garcetti test, the court went on to analyze the case under the Pickering
balancing standard.147 The court held that even if Ms. Graziosi did
speak on a matter of public interest, namely that the Police Chief did
not send a representative to a fellow officer’s funeral, “Ms. Graziosi’s limited First Amendment interest d[id] not require Chief Cannon to ‘tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt
the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.’”148 It should be recognized that “the ability of a police
department to maintain discipline and good working relationships
amongst employees is a legitimate governmental interest.”149 Nevertheless, hearing a “buzz” or gossip around the department, as the
Chief in Graziosi testified, does not rise to the level of destroying
harmony or working relationships within the department.150 In fact,
it is inevitable that employees, regardless of the field of work or department, gossip about events or fellow employees and employers.151 A mere “buzz” is not a compelling reason to curtail a public
employee’s First Amendment rights on an issue that was clearly in
the public interest––otherwise there would have been no “buzz” in
the first place.152 Not only was the government given deference in
this respect, but the court never even discussed the interests that
weighed in favor of Graziosi’s speech––they simply focused on the
interests that weighed against it.153 Under Grazioci’s interpretation
of the balancing test, “Internet postings w[ill] be considered presumptively disruptive to the government’s ability to provide efficient and effective services to the public due to their ability to go
146
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viral,” and the balance would be tipped in favor of the government
even if the speech was made by the employee as a citizen on a matter
of public interest.154
Additionally, “if the court finds that the employer reasonably
believed the speech compromised these goals, the employee’s
speech is not protected by the First Amendment, and he or she is
subject to appropriate discipline.”155 “Reasonably believe” is the
epitome of a subjective test, and, when coupled with the deference
the court is showing for the government’s interests versus the interests of the employee, it shows to be disastrous for employees’ free
speech.156
B. Pickering “balancing” is Lethal to Public Employee Speech
and Makes Free Speech Values Obsolete.
1. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
By tilting the balance of the Pickering test in favor of the government’s interest, the courts are hindering open and free debate.
For example, in its decision in Graziosi, the court made clear that
the speech’s forum was their main concern.157 They stated that “Facebook, Twitter and the like seem to have a special power to bring
an issue before the masses, especially when a story goes viral, and
is on a sensitive subject such as the funeral of a fellow officer.”158
However, what the court did not take into consideration was that
their decision has a damaging implication for free speech values.
Social media embraces the marketplace theory because “it enables
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virtually anyone to contribute comments, thoughts, and ideas” to a
particular conversation.159
Although the court would rather curtail speech that travels too
far and wide, it does not recognize that this is the ideal situation for
the marketplace of ideas. The farther the idea spreads, and to the
most people, the better informed the public will be and the easier it
will be to find the truth.160 Additionally, social media is the most
effective and least costly way to distribute information and ideas to
the masses of people.161 Anybody with an Internet connection can
register a free account with a social media provider and proceed to
share her thoughts with the rest of the online universe if she so
chooses.162 Social media reduces the barriers of who can enter into
the marketplace of ideas, and where they can enter it.163 The contributions on social media are global––social media knows no borders
or distances; they result in the most diverse opinions the market
could possibly offer.164
Although it could be argued that there are other media through
which these ideas could be distributed, such as televisions or newspapers, that argument is ultimately ignoring the high barriers of entry. Mass media outlets, in the interest of time, efficiency, cost, and
ratings are very specific as to what they publish and by whom.165
Social media knows no such discrimination.
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2. DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE AND SUPERIOR
ACCOUNTABILITY
Although courts discount “disruption” as a negative thing and
promote “harmony within the workplace,” “a little disruption can be
a good thing to uncover corruption and to promote self-autonomy
and accountability.”166 In Justice Souter’s dissent in Garcetti, he
emphasized that there is a Congressional Concurrent Resolution that
recognizes that public employees, despite their employment, maintain obligations as U.S. citizens that include “[p]ut[ting] loyalty to
the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons,
party, or government department,” and to “[e]xpose corruption
wherever discovered.”167 Despite this resolution, which was written
by Congress itself, employees are being punished for complying
with their civic duty.
Additionally, giving the government’s interests deference over
employee’s interest in speech promotes complacency both from the
employee and the employer. On one hand, the “stream of disappointments and failed battles” will make employees satisfied with simply
receiving a paycheck every week and “beat [them] into submission”
to the point where they no longer complain nor care about the affairs
of their government entity.168 This creates an atmosphere where employees are not fulfilled and are not permitted to reach their full potential.169 They will not criticize their employer––not because they
do not believe that a certain subject is worthy of criticism, but
“they’ve just been programmed to believe that raising issues is futile
and therefore they are better off just staying under the radar in every
way.”170
On the other hand, supervisors will also become complacent. If
a supervisor does not have to worry about an employee’s complaints
or concerns, she will never have to worry about her job either. As a
result, a domino effect will take place, in which some will perform
their duties poorly and others might engage in unethical behavior
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and corruption. Finally, if employers always come out on the winning end of the First Amendment question because all criticism or
hurtful speech made against them is silenced, it will devalue the positive reviews that employees may give them because there will be
no point of comparison. In essence, there will be no negative speech,
there will either be positive speech or silence.
In Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, he argued that the Establishment of a Religion would
simply “foster in those who still reject [the established religion], a
suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies to trust it
to its own merits.”171 In the same way here, the limiting of critical
speech against the government undermines the integrity of that entity by making it appear as if it is not legitimate but for the chilling
of this criticism.172
3. SELF-AUTONOMY AND EXPRESSION
The current interpretation of the Pickering balancing test is left
to be open, broad, and subjective.173 “Judges exercise substantial, if
not unfettered, discretion in deciding this question, based on an individualized evaluation of both the quantity and quality of disruption.”174 Because there is no clear rule, it is difficult for individuals
to predict what types of speech might cost them their employment
and conform their behavior to those standards.175 For example, two
Tenth Circuit panels had polar opposite interpretations of almost
identical cases in which police officers displayed signs on their
yards favoring candidates in local elections.176 While one panel held
that the sign was not protected by the First Amendment “due to the
danger that the public would come to doubt the impartiality of the
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police,” a second panel held that a similar sign was protected because there was little chance of disruption.177
This “reasonably disruptive standard” is a slippery slope in
which all comments can be potentially described as disruptive. Relying on the public’s reaction to an employee’s speech is equivalent
to permitting a “heckler’s veto,” which the Supreme Court has held
to be an unconstitutional basis for restricting protected expression.178 Under this balancing test, the manner or content of the employee’s speech is irrelevant.179 As long as the public has some sort
of reaction to the speech, whether it be supporting it or disagreeing
with it, it is likely that the employee will lose constitutional protection for this speech.180 If, conversely, the public never learns about
the speech or, for whatever reason, is not interested in it, the employee has more of a chance of obtaining First Amendment protection.181 This defeats the entire purpose of free speech, because even
if the speech is allowed to be said or posted on social media, it loses
its intrinsic value if it is not communicated or heard by others.
While the courts believe that they are protecting the government
through this interpretation of the balancing test and promoting its
efficiency by chilling some types of speech, they are doing the exact
opposite.182 Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Garcetti “protects whistleblowers if they go to the press [with their concerns] but
offers them no such protection if the employee goes directly to their
supervisor.”183 This makes the government more inefficient and prevents public concerns from being aired up the chain of command.184
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C. Solving the Pickering “Balance” Problem
The government’s and the employee’s interests should be given
equal weight in the balancing test, rather than the government’s interest receiving priority. The Court’s current interpretation supports
a subjective “reasonable belief” by an employer that speech by an
employee would cause disruption or inefficiency as enough to tip
the balance for the government.185 This interpretation should be
abolished altogether.186 The latitude given to this deference is unfair
and overbroad because the employer can manufacture a reasonable
belief that “the government employees’ speech affects morale in the
workplace, fosters disharmony, impedes the employees’ own ability
to perform duties, or obstructs established working relationships” in
order to fire him.187
Furthermore, the fact that the speech was expressed through social media, rather than through another medium, should not make
the speech presumptively disruptive.188 The test should “protect
both employer and employee interests, instead of elevating one interest over the other”; this would “further equalize the employment
relationship” rather than cause a divide between the employees and
employers.189
Courts should revert to the old test, created in Pickering, in
which there must be an actual showing of disruption or inefficiency
by the employee before the employer can take an adverse employment action.190 The Pickering requirement of “actual disruption” is
not a perfect one, as it has a tendency to have a finding of disruption
by an employee only after the disruption has actually occurred and
the damage to the government entity is done. However, it is better
to err on the side of protecting individual’s Constitutional rights,
both as citizens and employees, than to use a “subjective standard
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that gives government employers the ability to make subjective decisions based on speculative belief as to the disruptive impact of employee speech.”191
Nevertheless, in equalizing the weight of the employees’ interests in their speech, the courts need to tread lightly. Although employees’ interests should be taken into account, they should not automatically outweigh those of the employer on the majority of occasions––the balancing should not go as far as the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) has.
1. NLRA’S EXPANSIVE PROTECTION
The NLRA was enacted by Congress to guarantee basic employee rights to employees in the private sector.192 Section 7 of the
NLRA states, “Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid and protection.”
As a result, it is illegal for an employer to fire an employee who
has engaged in Section 7 protected activity.193
The problem arises in that NLRA cases allow employees to virtually get away with any speech at their employer’s expense. There
is nothing that employers can do to protect their online reputation
“from the damaging public comments of irate employees, unless
such comments are either threatening or outrageously egregious.”194
But, in practice, they cannot even protect themselves from this. Although, “in theory, it may be possible for an employee to lose the
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protections of the NLRA through necessary disparagement, in practice, the General Counsel has actually allowed the Facebook comments to go quite far.”195
For example, photographs of an employer-sponsored sales event
where an employee made sarcastic comments about the food, calling
it, among other things, “stale and overcooked,” was not disparaging
of the employer’s product and did not lose NLRA protection.196 Additionally, it has been held that employees who use profane language
to criticize one of the owners is protected by the NLRA when the
profanity is intertwined with criticism pertaining to working conditions.197
In a case in which an employee spoke obscenities of his employer for not withholding the proper amount of taxes from his
paychecks, the Board decided that the employee was protected by
the NLRA.198 Despite the profane words he used, the Board held
that the purpose of the employee’s conversation was to “seek and
provide mutual support looking toward group action to encourage
the employer to address problems in terms and conditions of employment, not to disparage its product or services or undermine its
reputation.”199 In fact, the General Counsel has stated that even a
“Facebook conversation in which an employee called her supervisor
a ‘dick’ and a ‘scumbag’ did not raise to the level of disparagement
that would lose protection of the act.”200
Pursuant to this statement, an employee was protected by the
NLRA when he called the owner of a company that employed him
a “F’ing mother F’ing” and “F’ing crook” and an “a_hole,” on social
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media and added that “the manager was stupid, nobody liked him,
and everyone talked about him behind his back.”201
However, if this particular case had occurred in the public
sphere, it would most surely not have First Amendment protection–
–and, in this case, it should not. The courts would likely hold that
Garcetti applies because, in light of precedent, comments about supervision concerns can be interpreted to be “pursuant to job duties.”
Even if it was assumed that Garcetti did not apply, and even if it
could be argued that these profane comments were in the “public
interest,” the government’s interest in avoiding disruption and protecting the efficiency of the government entity would likely outweigh the employee’s interest in disparaging his supervisor on social media. It might even be seen as a defamatory comment, which
has no free speech value under First Amendment jurisprudence.202
In this case, however, the courts would be correct.
Doctrine, whether public or private sector, cannot go as far as to
allow employees to speak about their employers with blatant disrespect and minimize them in the eyes of the public because they are
not happy with some aspect of their job. The NLRA leaves employers helpless to defend their legitimate business interest in their goodwill, while simultaneously rendering the NLRA ineffective.203
While employers have to keep paying the salaries of employees who
have publicly insulted their business, their hands are tied and resentment towards employees is built.204 All in all, the NLRA ends up
“embold[ing] bullies––not victims––by protecting disparaging remarks as if they contain something of value.”205
On the other hand, although the NLRA is overbroad, it grants
some protection to employees that the public sector does not, yet
should. For example, if a government employee who was demoted
criticized his supervisor’s decisions on social media, where he is Facebook friends with his fellow employees, he would be protected by
201
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the NLRA, but not the First Amendment. Under a First Amendment
analysis, even though there are employee interests in obtaining his
fellow employee’s opinions through the post or in potentially getting
an unjust demotion overturned by that supervisor’s superiors, it will
likely not be protected.
If this issue reached the Court, it would likely hold, under current doctrine, that the employee “reasonably believed” that the Facebook status could cause a disruption, namely that the rest of the
employees might rise against the employer to prevent their own demotion, which they will be sure is imminent. Nevertheless, this same
scenario under current NLRA law would be protected because it
would be considered “protected concerted activity” where one employee is reaching out to other employees for mutual protection regarding job conditions.
In this situation, the NLRA would balance the interests of the
employee and employer better than current First Amendment doctrine would. This is a contradiction in itself. The First Amendment
was enacted to protect people from their government, and they are
currently being protected from anybody but. Additionally, disruption is part of the process of making an injustice just. If, after investigation, there is a realization that there was no injustice, the post
still has free speech value because it would have given the public
another point of view, which they are free to disagree with and is
consistent with the “marketplace of ideas” theory. In fact, they may
even side with the supervisor. But no matter who they decide to support, it gives the employees, or the public for that matter, the ability
to decide whether they are happy with those representing them in
this particular government entity (in this case the supervisor) or not.
If they are not, they have the power to petition for change. This is
consistent with the ideas of self-democracy and political autonomy.
V. CONCLUSION
“As social media gives employees a platform to amplify their
voice, it simultaneously enlarges the risk of undermining management’s right to control its business.”206 In the public sphere, the current doctrine’s response to social media’s ability to spread speech is
206
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to, ultimately, silence it. Although this will be beneficial to government entities by protecting their images and maintaining harmony
at work, the downfalls reflect not only on the employees, but on all
American citizens. By upholding this doctrine, we are unintentionally discarding all of the free speech values that the Founders had in
mind when they drafted the First Amendment. To avoid turning the
free speech of government employees into an old and archaic notion,
we should broaden the interpretation of the doctrine as a whole.
However, we should keep in mind that extremes are not efficient
and avoid going as far as prioritizing employee interests over all
else, such as has been done under the NLRA. Taking this moderate
approach will honor Justice Stevens’ answer to the question, “Does
the First Amendment protect employee speech?,” to which he answered “sometimes”––not “never.”207
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